It was more than symbolic that Bronislaw Komorowski was elected President of Poland in the second round of voting on Sunday July 4th – American Independence Day. Although the timing was purely random, and the result of an electoral calendar suddenly imposed on Poland following the tragic death of former President Lech Kaczynski in the April 10th Smolensk air disaster, those hoping for a new chapter in Polish-US relations could not but have seen it as an omen. As Bronislaw Komorowski prepares to make his first official visit to the US, it is opportune to ask to what extent his election as President indeed presages a new positive chapter in transatlantic relations – business-wise and politically – for Poland?
Kaczynski’s stance was not shared by the government of Donald Tusk, with whom Kaczynski was forced to “cohabit” after the 2007 parliamentary elections which brought the current ruling Civic Platform (PO) party to power. The 2007-2010 period was marked by both policy and institutional friction between President Kaczynski and the Government, with policy towards Russia, Europe and Germany being the most visible areas of conflict. During this period, however, attention was focussed on the public differences between Kaczynski and Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, with Bronislaw Komorowski remaining in the background by virtue of his post as Speaker of the Parliament. It was with some interest therefore that analysts wondered where Komorowski stood on the issue of Polish-US relations, and whether his presidency would mark a departure from Kaczynski’s strident pro-Americanism.
Komorowski’s own background prior to his winning the presidency would have been a mixed indicator of his position. His political baptism had come in the late 1970s and 1980s, when as an anticommunist dissident he had been incarcerated in communist prisons. He was an historian by profession and in the 1980s devoted himself to underground publishing, editing the “ABC” journal that was focussed on supporting the oppressed nationalities of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. He had some opportunity in the 1990s to display his foreign policy sympathies, as his activity in politics was focussed on defence policy, first as deputy minister of defence in the early part of the decade, before becoming full defence minister in 2000-2001. He was also an active member of the parliamentary defence committee. It was in these defence and security roles that he was seen as having Atlanticist sympathies, working hard for Polish membership of NATO. Most significantly, he was also a supporter of the decision by the post-communist government of Leszek Miller to purchase US F-16 aircraft for the Polish air force, working hard in parliament – despite his opposition role – to create a cross-party political consensus around the procurement decision.
Yet over the last few years, as Komorowski’s career developed, it was clear that any uncritical pro-US sympathies that he possessed were on the wane, and he was increasingly seen as moving towards a more European perspective. Much of this shift was driven by what Komorowski saw as Poland’s real geopolitical interest, which was to engage actively in Europe following Poland’s EU membership in 2004. In his perception he was additionally shaped by his own intellectual and political environment and the views of those he regarded as his political mentors, especially the first Prime Minister of independent Poland in 1989 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who has long regarded himself as part of the community of European Christian-Democratic politicians.
However, Komorowski’s position was clearly most shaped by the broader political conflict with President Kaczynski and the desire by Komorowski and the PO to put as much deep blue water between themselves and Kaczynski’s domestic and foreign policy positions, and reverse what they saw as the isolation of Poland in Europe that Kaczynski was in danger of bringing about. In this sense, a major realignment of relations with Brussels, Germany and Russia – from Komorowski’s perspective – would have to go hand in hand. A rapprochement with Russia would open doors to Poland in Brussels and Germany, where for long Poland had been viewed as “unconstructive” in its perceived anti-Russian attitudes; by moving closer to Brussels, Poland would be able to influence EU policy towards its eastern neighbours; and by making Germany its strategic partner, Poland would gain an ally in relation to its own interests vis-à-vis Brussels and Russia. This shift, in the eyes of Komorowski and his party allies, would not only elevate Poland’s European influence, but also would be welcomed by the domestic electorate, tired of Poland being perceived as an oddity in Europe, and also – because of labour migration – also seeing its interests as tied much more to Europe.
In this shift, Komorowski’s enthusiasm for the US cannot have been helped by the perception that the Obama administration also had different priorities than focussing on Central Europe. The decision to cancel President Bush’s missile defence project would have been merely a confirmation to Komorowski of the shift in the US attitude to Poland.
Political timing has conspired to shift the US even further away from Komorowski’s attentions. His desire to commence his presidency with a symbolic transition away from President Kaczynski was behind the high profile initial visits to Paris, Brussels and Berlin, and the decision to reinvigorate the Weimar Triangle relationship between Poland, Germany and France. Secondly, 2011 sees the Polish Presidency of the European Union, and was a further factor in concentrating Komorowski’s on Europe. Finally, as Europe itself starts to focus on deepening its relationship with Russia, Komorowski does not want to be seen as the head of a state torpedoing this initiative: hence his relative drawing away from support for Ukraine’s or Georgia’s pro-Western aspirations. Not without significance either are the initial nominations of Komorowski’s advisers, some of whom have a clear pro-European tendencies. These include defence and security adviser Roman Kuzniar, and Jaromir Sokolowski, Komorowski state secretary for international affairs whose speciality is relations with Germany.
Time will tell whether the office of President will cause Komorowski to rebalance his attention towards the US. He is of course travelling to the US on December 8th, but some topics of discussion may not be comfortable for the US, including Poland’s desire to withdraw from Afghanistan sooner than later, and certainly sooner than the US would like to see. It will be on energy security that Komorowski will be tested, as the United States is especially keen to see US companies start exploiting shale gas reserves in Poland – an initiative that Komorowski has displayed some scepticism about. On the other hand, the United States will be relieved to be hosting a country that is rebuilding its influence in Europe, rather than being a near-pariah state. Insofar as the US has always looked to Germany as Europe’s key player, and is interested in seeing the EU take up more of the security burden globally, the fact that Poland once again has seat at Europe’s top table will help Washington take Warsaw seriously.
In the last two decades it has been Poland’s political Right and Left that have been most uncritically pro-US. As Poland, with the election of Komorowski, confirms a more centrist domestic political consensus, so the relationship with America will seemingly increasingly be based around real interests and rational policymaking rather than on sentiment and illusion. Where these interests take the two countries in the future, however, is anyone’s guess.
Marek Matraszek is a Founding Partner of CEC Government Relations and author of FromtheFront.net.